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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effect of information disclosure on banks’ portfolio risk. We cast
a simple banking system into a general equilibrium model with trading frictions. We find
that the information disclosure lowers the expected risk-adjusted profits for a non-negligible
fraction of banks. The magnitude of this effect depends on the structure of the banking
system and, alarmingly, it is more pronounced for systemically important institutions. We
connect these theoretical findings to the stress test procedure, where bank information is
disclosed by the regulator. The 2011 and 2014 stress tests are used in an empirical study to
further support our theoretical results.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers were faced with a task of
restoring the soundness and safety of financial systems. An extra effort has been made to
ensure the stability of financial institutions and to make their balance sheets as transparent
as possible.1 The stress test procedure has been developed as a part of this endeavor, aiming
at “assessing the resilience of financial institutions to adverse market developments, as well
as to contribute to the overall assessment of systemic risk in the EU financial system”.2
Alternatively, one could view the stress test as a stability analysis of financial institutions in
various adverse scenarios.
As a part of the procedure, banks are required to disclose otherwise unavailable informa-
tion.3 There is an ongoing debate on whether such information should be disclosed and if
so, how detailed it should be. A growing strand of literature, both theoretical and empirical
(see Prescott (2008) and Goldstein and Leitner (2017) for theories and Schuermann (2014)
for empirical evidence), provides mixed results on the issue. The advantages appear to be
clear: information disclosure helps to discipline banks, reduces adverse selection, and leads
to more informative prices. One could easily agree that market transparency seems like a
desirable feature. However, Goldstein and Leitner (2017) find that during normal times, no
disclosure is optimal. They show that during bad times some disclosure is necessary, but too
much may destroy risk-sharing. Moreover, Goldstein and Yang (2017) show that disclosing
public information has a potential negative indirect effect of changing price informativeness.
1Further details can be found in the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel Accords for US and Europe, respectively.
2European Banking Authority (EBA) definition of the stress test’s purpose.
3From 2011 the stress test procedure is coordinated by the EBA. The scope is to analyze the evolution
of banks’ capital under both a baseline as well as an adverse scenario over a two-year period. The setup
of the two scenarios is provided by the European Commission (baseline) and the European Systemic Risk
Board (adverse). The European Central Bank is responsible for interacting with banks during the exercise
and for the validation of banks’ data and results. Although stress test methodology can differ from one
year to another, the basic timeline of the procedure stays the same. In the first step, the EBA announces
the new round of stress tests. In the second step, it publishes the methodology and the scenarios that
will be used. In the third step, it publishes the final template for the test such that banks can simulate
the scenarios themselves. Finally, the EBA reports both results and the micro-data used during the pro-
cedure. This last step is what we mean by information disclosure. For details on current methodology see
http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-issues-2018-eu-wide-stress-test-methodology-for-discussion.
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Our main finding indicates that the information disclosure may result in a reduction of
risk-adjusted expected profits for a non-negligible fraction of banks in the system. We refer
to this change of risk-adjusted expected profits as the disclosure effect. Interestingly, in our
model, systemically important banks4 gain the least from the disclosure and bear the highest
cost in terms of its volatility. Moreover, their likelihood of experiencing a negative disclosure
effect (as a result of new information) is higher.
These results follow from a simple one-period general equilibrium model in which agents
(hereafter banks) face trading frictions. Being the main ingredient of our framework, trading
frictions can be seen as a network of connections. Bank A is said to be connected to bank
B if and only if A is not constrained in investing into B’s asset. Therefore, the network is
simply a way of writing down the portfolio constraints in a systematic way, which allows us
to assess the structure of these restrictions.
The simulation exercise suggests that disclosure is beneficial in a sense that an average
bank is expected to attain a positive profit. However, there are multiple factors that could
possibly tip the scales towards non disclosure. Firstly, we show that systemically important
banks are more likely to be negatively affected by the disclosure. Alarmingly, these are the
players that could potentially destabilize the whole system.5 Secondly, one needs to take into
account the network density (the level of banks’ interconnectedness) when drawing policy
implications. We find that a negative disclosure effect is more likely to be observed in low
density networks.
We further show that these results are robust across different connection structures. The
effect is present is simulated homogeneous networks as well as in network structures more
similar to the actual financial systems. Moreover, we include an empirical section where
we test our model predictions using the actual 2011 and 2014 stress tests. Results support
4We focus on the network component of systemic risk where the institutions’ positions play vital role.
Throughout the paper, we use the terms systemic risk and network systemic risk interchangeably.
5The literature provides several examples in which systemically important banks can endanger the in-
tegrity of the network via contagious defaults (see Allen and Gale (2000) or Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer
(2006)).
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our theoretical findings - i.e., banks subjected to a stress test procedure exhibit lower future
expected risk adjusted profits.
Related literature. Our work contributes to a few strands of literature. Broadly, our
paper fits within the scope of the literature on public information disclosure. In frictionless
markets more information is always ex-ante better for a decision maker, a result known as
Blackwell’s Theorem (Blackwell (1951)). However, when operating in an environment with
asymmetric information, more information does not necessarily imply an improvement.
The proponents of public information disclosure argue that it disciplines markets, reduces
adverse selection, and improves price informativeness (Tarullo (2010), Bernanke (2013)). Di-
amond (1985) shows that optimal disclosure reduces information asymmetries and enhances
trade. Moreover, Korn and Schiller (2003) show that firms lose the ability to misreport
under mandatory disclosure. Additionally, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) demonstrate how
correlated firms’ values can increase the welfare under mandatory disclosure.
However, there are also arguments why public information disclosure can be harmful.
Hirshleifer (1971) shows that releasing information about the future state of the economy
destroys ex-ante risk-sharing incentives. Goldstein and Leitner (2017) apply this idea to
study the optimal disclosure policy in banking systems. They find that disclosing too much
destroys the risk-sharing, but disclosing too little might result in a market breakdown in
the time of a crisis. Andolfatto, Berentsen, and Waller (2014) show that it is only optimal
to disclose information to prevent agents from its costly acquisition. Alvarez and Barlevy
(2015) show in a model of information spillover that the decision to disclose depends on the
presence of contagion. Furthermore, Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2014) show
that frequent disclosure requirements may lead to managers’ short-termism.
Morris and Shin (2002) provide an argument which is based on the dichotomy between
public and private information. If there is no private information, public disclosure is always
welfare enhancing. However, in the presence of private information, an increase in public
information precision can be detrimental. If access to the private information is costly, agents
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have less incentive to obtain it and rely on the - possibly imprecise - public information. In
comparison, disclosure in our model is unanticipated. This ensures that the only friction in
the agents’ decision making are their portfolio constraints.
Prescott (2008) provides an additional argument against information disclosure, namely
possible detrimental welfare effects caused by disclosure during bad times. As a result, by
disclosing banks’ private information, the regulators’ ability to obtain such information in
the first place is threatened. In comparison, there is no business cycle in our model. ?
show that disclosure can also simply reduce investors’ incentives to acquire and trade on
private information. Earlier literature also argues that mandatory information disclosure
may simply be unnecessary because firms have plenty incentives to disclose information by
themselves (see Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), and Milgrom (2007)).
This paper adds to the existing literature by showing that the information disclosure
may have negative effects even in a simple general equilibrium framework with portfolio
constraints. We show the implications of the banking system network structure on the effect
of information disclosure. More importantly, our paper shows that systemically important
banks are more likely to suffer from disclosure.
Our work is closely linked to many of the papers we have already mentioned. Similarly
to Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), our framework is also built around different effects of cor-
related assets, only we do not focus on a welfare analysis. Unlike Tarullo (2010), Bernanke
(2013) or Diamond (1985) who focus on agency problems, our model uses a general equilib-
rium market mechanism with trading frictions instead. Similarly to Goldstein and Leitner
(2017) and Andolfatto et al. (2014), we question the purpose of disclosure. The same goes
for Prescott (2008), except instead of incorporating a business cycle into our model, we focus
on a market-implied riskiness resulting from a general equilibrium.
Our work also contributes to the literature on financial networks (see e.g. Upper (2011),
Poledna, Molina-Borboa, Martnez-Jaramillo, van der Leij, and Thurner (2015), or alterna-
tively Roukny, Battiston, and Stiglitz (2016)). We offer a novel modeling approach based
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on a simple general equilibrium framework. It has a closed form solution which makes it
computationally attractive, while being easily implemented by a regulator at the same time.
Translating the portfolio constraints into network connections constitutes a new perspective
on systemic risk. Empirical works on the subject include Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and
Richardson (2017a) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).
As suggested by the title, a practical example of information disclosure is the stress
testing procedure. We strive to contribute to the debate on its proper design (see Goldstein
and Sapra (2014)). Our paper provides a potential channel (trading frictions) to complement
the literature on negative effects of information disclosure.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 1 introduces the theoretical framework. Section
2 describes the simulation exercise. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 presents
the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
1 The Model
1.1 Two-period Finance Economy with Network Constraints
In order to study the effect of information disclosure we employ a general equilibrium
framework in which agents (banks) are treated as portfolio maximizers.6 The economic
environment is a standard one-period (two dates) finance economy, with dates labeled as
t = 0, 1 and N banks.
At t = 0, bank i ∈ {1, ..., N} has an endowment of size 1 as well as access to its own
investment opportunity (referred to as an asset or project).7 The value of this endowment is
6Other papers in the literature address information disclosure in a game-theoretic framework with strate-
gic interactions, see Goldstein and Leitner (2017) for instance. We have settled for a general equilibrium with
simulated networks because it provides tractable solutions while not losing the potential applicability to a
real world data. Even though networks in our model are simulated, we still regard our work as a theoretical
paper. The main advantage of our approach is that it allows us to study the market effects instead of the
player’ strategic interactions. The idea behind this framework is that prices are determined in equilibrium
and banks’ risk adjusted profits are indirectly affected as a result.
7These projects can be seen as a bank’s external assets on international markets. Hence the correlation
with other banks in the network.
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a (t = 1)-measurable random variable and can generally be interpreted as bank i’s project.
The access to their respective projects is then traded among banks for the purpose of diver-
sification and risk-adjusted profit maximization. Projects/assets are perfectly divisible into
arbitrarily small amounts. Due to a one-to-one relationship, we will further refer to banks
and their assets (or projects) interchangeably. The assets’ returns, X, are assumed to be
jointly normally distributed with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix V . Moreover, each
bank has access to an unlimited quantity of risk-free asset that delivers 1 unit of consumption
at time t = 1 per 1 unit invested at time t = 0.
Banks are not allowed to trade freely with each other. We assume that each bank has its
own specific set of counterparties available for trading. More precisely, bank i is said to be
connected to bank j if and only if bank i can purchase asset j. Therefore one can represent
the banking system as a network in which nodes correspond to banks and edges stand for
trading opportunities. This network is characterized by an adjacency matrix G.8
Formally the maximization problem of bank i at t = 0 is given by:
max
{φi,θi}∈RN+1
{
E[Yi]− 1
2
Var [Yi]
}
s.t.
pi = p
′φi + θi
Yi = X′φi + θi
φi ∈ Ai1 × Ai2 × · · · × AiN
Ain =

R if gin = 1
{∅} if gin = 0
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
(1)
where X = [X1, . . . ,XN ]′ is a t = 1-measurable random vector of assets’ returns, φi =
8Each element, gij , of G is either 0 or 1, that is, gij ∈ {0, 1}. If gij = 1 then bank i is connected to bank
j, otherwise it is not. Connections need not be symmetric, e.g. i being connected to j does not imply j
being connected to i. Also, since we assume that every bank can always decide to hold some fraction of its
own asset, self-connections are feasible such that gii = 1 for all i.
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[φi1, ..., φiN ]
′ is a vector of bank i portfolio exposures, θi is bank i’s holding of the risk-free
asset, p = [p1, ..., pN ]
′ is the price vector of risky assets, Yi is the value of bank i’s portfolio,
and gij is the (i, j) element of the adjacency matrix G. The first constraint is the resource
constraint. At time t = 0, the market value of bank i’s initial endowment is equal to pi.
This represents the wealth that is allocated between risky assets (having value p′φi) and the
risk-free asset (having value θi). The second constraint says that the value of the bank i’s
portfolio at time t = 1 is the sum of payoffs from the risky asset holdings X′φi and the risk
free-rate θi. Finally, the last two lines restrict banks to invest only into counterparties that
they are connected to.
We follow a standard definition of equilibrium:
Definition 1.1. An equilibrium is characterized by a price vector p∗ and allocations {φ∗i }Ni=1
and {θ∗i }Ni=1 such that
(i) every bank i ∈ {1, . . . , N} solves the maximization problem in (1) taking prices as
given
(ii) markets clear
φ∗1 + φ
∗
2 + · · ·+ φ∗N = 1 (2)
Under the assumption of jointly normally distributed asset payoffs, the equilibrium price
vector and demand functions can be obtained in closed form. Proposition 1.1 presents this
result.
Proposition 1.1. Assume that the vector of asset payoffs, X, is jointly normally distributed
with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ, then the demand function for risky assets
of bank i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is given by
φi = Σ
−1 (µ− p− λi) (3)
where λi := [λi1, ..., λiN ]
′ ≥ 0 is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the appro-
priate network constraints. Given the demand equations in (3), the market clearing condition
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in (2) determines the equilibrium price vector
p∗ = µ− 1
N
Σ1− 1
N
N∑
j=1
λj. (4)
The proof is in Appendix A.
1.2 The Model with Disclosure
In our model, the disclosure mechanism works via the information about the variance-
covariance matrix of assets’ returns. In the previous section banks had access to matrix V
when making their decisions. In the current section, banks do not observe V . Instead, they
form identical beliefs about it, represented by a matrix W . Therefore, W can be seen as a
noisy observation of the true variance-covariance matrix V .9 The matrix V is revealed to
banks with zero probability after their initial portfolio choice. This modeling approach of
assuming zero probability event builds on Allen and Gale (2000).10
At t = 0, banks form the optimal portfolios based on the N × N positive definite ma-
trix W . We denote the vector of allocations of risky assets based on this initial belief by
{φi (W )}Ni=1 to stress their dependence on W . If no disclosure takes place, then banks keep
these allocations until returns are realized and the model is identical to (1) with Σ = W .
In the zero probability event (where the true variance-covariance matrix V is revealed)
banks can readjust their existing portfolios upon learning new information. In such a case
9Section 2.1 contains detailed information about the banks’ belief structure.
10In Allen and Gale (2000) a financial contagion is spread in the system after a liquidity shock is realized.
Given that the shock is assumed to be a zero probability event, banks do not take it into account when
making their decisions at time zero.
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bank i solves the following optimization problem:
max
{φi(V ),θi(V )}∈RN+1
{
E[Yi]− 1
2
Var [Yi]
}
s.t.
p′(V )φi(W ) + θi(W ) = p′(V )φi(V ) + θi(V )
Yi = X′φi(V ) + θi(V )
φi(V ) ∈ Ai1 × Ai2 × · · · × AiN
Ain =

R if gin = 1
{∅} if gin = 0
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
(5)
This problem does not introduce any new variables. We merely stress the dependence
of φi, θi, and p on either W or V . The difference between the two optimizations lies in
the bank’s endowment, which is now equal to the market value of its portfolio (see the first
constraint in (5)).
Everything else stays the same, including the network constraint. Thus, Proposition 1.1
applies with Σ exchanged for V .
1.3 Discussion of the Main Assumptions
We assume that banks are risk averse, which is a necessary condition for their interest
in diversification. Risk aversion can be seen as a modeling device to capture regulatory
requirements (e.g. requiring banks to keep some level of capital according to Basel III). In
the literature, it is often assumed that banks are so well diversified that they behave in a
risk-neutral fashion. However, this is only true for the marginal investment. In our case,
banks’ connection constraints create a limit to diversification.11
11The banks in our model are not subjected to any explicit regulatory capital requirements. Risk aversion is
implicitly capturing such effects as more risk averse banks would invest a higher fraction of their endowment
into the risk-free asset and de facto keep a higher capital buffer. In our model investment in the risk-free asset
is basically a cash accumulation. Another option is to include an additional constraint which forces banks to
keep a given fraction of safe capital. For example, Efing (2016) includes an explicit regulatory constraint in a
10
We assume mean-variance preferences. For any other standard preference structure, we
expect to observe qualitatively similar results.12 Mean-variance preferences allow for the
equilibrium price vector and the demand schedules to be obtained in closed form.
We assume that the network of connections is fixed. Preventing banks from changing
their respective sets of counterparties can be justified by two arguments. Firstly, undertaking
new business relationship might be a long process which is not captured in our one-period
model. Secondly, creating new connections might be too costly.
2 Simulation Framework
2.1 The Structure of the Banks’ Beliefs
We use the following structure to ensure consistency between beliefs and the true variance-
covariance matrix. We assume that the vector of asset payoffs, X, is conditionally normally
distributed
X|V, µ ∼ NN (µ, V ) (6)
where µ is the vector of expected payoffs and V the variance-covariance matrix of the assets’
payoffs. We keep µ constant and equal across all assets since we want to isolate the effect of
disclosure with respect to the uncertainty about the variance/covariance matrix, V .
We sample V from the inverse-Wishart distribution. That is,
V ∼ W−1N (S, d) (7)
model very similar to ours. Building on his paper and incorporating such additional constraint in our model
brings several negative aspects and no qualitatively improvements. First, we would not be able to solve the
model in closed form which is one of the nice features that makes this model computationally feasible. From
economic perspective, a regulatory constraint would definitively affect the initial portfolio allocations. The
set of allocations would differ if the constraint is binding for at least one bank. However, the mechanics
of the information disclosure would still be in place as banks will try to re-optimize upon receiving new
information. Thus results would be affected only quantitatively but not qualitatively. It is worth noting that
a regulatory constraint would eliminate our disclosure effect only if it completely prevents banks to invest in
risky assets. As our model aims at providing qualitative results on negative effect of information disclosure
created by network frictions, we opted to shut down the regulatory constraint channel.
12This is due to banks acting as individual (atomistic) optimizers.
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where N is the total number of banks in the system, S is an (N×N) positively definite scale
matrix, and d > N−1 measures the degrees of freedom. We let banks form their beliefs about
the true variance/covariance matrix, V , by estimating the empirical variance/covariance
matrix of asset payoffs W .13
2.2 Simulation Settings
In order to model a regulator’s limited knowledge about the structure of the system, we
use a simulation that samples over different random networks. Even though our model is
not meant to produce quantitative predictions, it potentially could. Still the main objective
is to obtain qualitative economic insights. Another reason for using simulation methods is
to observe the impact of different network structures.
We solve the model from Section 1 with the belief structure described in Section 2.1.
Each simulation begins by generating a random network represented by an N×N adjacency
matrix G. The number of banks, N , is set to either 50 or 100, and the number of iterations
to 15,000.
Once the network structure is generated, we sample a random positive definite scale
matrix S and follow the procedure described in Section 2.1. Having generated both V
and W we proceed to solve the model under both scenarios (with and without information
disclosure). Allocations and prices are recorded under both scenarios.
2.3 Key Outcome Variable: Risk-Adjusted Expected Profits
We look at changes in risk-adjusted expected profits of banks to analyze the effect of
information disclosure on the distribution of risk. The risk-adjusted expected profit of bank
i under the no-disclosure scenario is defined by the following ratio
Πndi
def
=
(µ− p∗ (W ))′φ∗i (W ) + p∗i (W )√
φ∗′i (W )V φ
∗
i (W )
(8)
13Each bank uses the same sample, which results in an equal information set.
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Under the disclosure scenario, the risk-adjusted expected profit for bank i is given by
Πdi
def
=
(µ− p∗(V ))′φ∗i (V ) + (p∗(V )− p∗(W ))′ φ∗i (W ) + p∗i (W )√
φ∗′i (V )V φ
∗
i (V )
(9)
Equations 8 and 9 can be thought of as pseudo-Sharpe ratios on bank i portfolios.
We define the disclosure effect, DE i, as the percentage change in the risk-adjusted ex-
pected profits, which is
DE i def= log
(
Πdi
Πndi
)
, (10)
This quantity allows us to study the effect of information disclosure on the distribution
of risk within a banking system. By constructing (8) and (9) as the ratio of expected returns
and their standard deviation, we are capturing the Basel III capital adequacy requirements
where risk-weighted assets are considered. Therefore, disclosure ought to be considered
beneficial when DE i ≥ 0 and detrimental when DE i < 0.
2.4 Network Structure and the Banks’ Systemic Relevance
We consider two types of network structure. The first type is a banking network generated
by the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) model. In this framework, every bank has the same probability,
q, to be connected to any other bank in the network. The resulting structure is therefore
homogeneous.
The second type is a core-periphery network structure where the probability of a con-
nection is empirically calibrated (see Puhr, Seliger, and Sigmund (2012) for data and Frey
and Hledik (2014) for the calibration method). Our interest in this type of network struc-
ture is motivated by its frequent appearance in banking systems.14 To model this observed
heterogeneity of real-world interbank networks, we slightly modify the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi setting.
14Many empirical papers document that various financial networks take core-periphery structure (see Boss,
Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner (2003), Minoiu and Reyes (2013), Fricke and Lux (2014), and Lelyveld and
Veld (2014)). Moreover, core-periphery networks often appear as an equilibrium outcome of the network
formation process as in Farboodi (2017).
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Instead of assuming that each pair of banks forms a connection with the same probability
q, we divide banks in two groups (core and periphery). The difference between these two
groups lies in their respective probabilities of forming connections with other banks. Any
core bank has a high probability of establishing a connection both with other core banks and
with other peripherals, while a connection between two peripherals is less likely. The result
of this method is a random network with the desired core-periphery structure.
Figure B.1 shows a stylized representation of both types of network structure.
We study the properties of the average disclosure in relation to the characteristics of
banking network. In particular, we characterize a network by its density, D(G):
D(G) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i 6=j
gij (11)
where gij is the the ij-th element of adjacency matrix G such that the numerator corresponds
to the number of all actual connections (edges) while the denominator represents all potential
connections in the system (excluding self-connections). By such a construction, a complete
network has a density of one, while an empty network has zero density.
Moreover, we examine how the bank’s position in the network affects its risk-adjusted
expected profit. In particular, we look at how the disclosure effect varies across banks of dif-
ferent network-systemic relevance. Usually, one thinks of systemically important institutions
as the ones whose failure could endanger the whole system. If such institutions were more
prone to suffer from the disclosure, then the stabilizing intention of the information revela-
tion policy could potentially be harmful from the systemic risk perspective. In our model,
a simple way to characterize systemic important banks is to consider the ratio of in- and
out-degrees of a bank (the ratio of the number of its in-connections and out-connections).15
Formally, we define the following systemic index for any bank i,
15A degree is a graph-theoretic concept that characterizes the number of links of a given node in the graph.
In our context, an in-degree of bank i refers to the number of banks that can invest into bank i’s project,
whereas the out-degree of bank i is the number of projects it can invest into itself.
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SI i(G) =
∑N
j gji∑N
j gij
, (12)
The idea behind this index is that a distressed bank with a relatively large in-degree
(i.e. there is a large number of banks exposed to the asset of this bank) could negatively
affect its neighboring banks via contagion.16 The in-degree of the bank is deflated by its out-
degree because banks with less diversification opportunities are expected to be riskier. We
would like to emphasize that this index is specifically designed to capture the network-related
systemic importance of a bank. According to the Financial Stability Board it is standard
to take into account bank’s size, complexity and other factors besides interconnectedness
when evaluating its systemic importance.17 In our model, banks are identical in terms of
their other observable characteristics. Therefore we evaluate banks’ systemic relevance solely
according to their position in the network.
3 Simulation Results
3.1 The Disclosure Effect in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Networks
Figure B.2 plots the full distribution of the disclosure effect. A non-negligible fraction
of the banking system is expected to have its risk-adjusted expected profit decreased (a
negative disclosure effect). This implies that there is a considerable part of the system which
is expected to suffer as a result of the disclosure. In other words, there is a non-negligible
probability that the information disclosure generates a negative effect on a given bank’s risk-
adjusted performance. This figure also underlines that a bank in a lower density network
16Notice that the index contains self-connections in both the numerator and the denominator. This is a
purely technical reason to avoid division by zero.
17Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are financial institutions whose distress or dis-
orderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant
disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. - http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-
development/systematically-important-financial-institutions-sifis/
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has a higher likelihood of exhibiting a negative disclosure effect.18
[Figure B.2]
Figure B.3 displays the average disclosure effect as a function of the underlying network
density. The figure underlines the importance of network characteristics for evaluating the
effects of information disclosure. The average disclosure effect exhibits a hump shape with its
peak at an intermediate density level and stays above zero throughout, thus, suggesting that
disclosure is beneficial in expectation. The same pattern can be observed for the standard
deviation of the disclosure effect, resulting in the observed pattern. The important take-away
from this figure is the positive relationship between average disclosure effect and its standard
deviation.19
[Figure B.3]
The increase in a bank’s riskiness could undermine the stability of the bank itself or,
in some cases, even the stability of the whole banking system through a contagion effect.
Despite the fact that we do not model contagion explicitly, there is a vast literature showing
the devastating effects of such an event (see for example Elsinger et al. (2006) or Roukny
et al. (2016)). Papers in this strand of literature show how a default of a single institution
can cause a large portion of the financial system to become distressed.
The fact that a part of the banking system is expected to become riskier is not surprising.
What seems to be more important is the relationship between a bank’s disclosure effect and
its network systemic importance. In order to get an idea about that, we rank all banks
based on the index in equation (12) such that bank 1 has the highest value of SI(G) and
bank 50 has the lowest. Figures B.4a and B.4b plot the average and standard deviation
18Higher density does not necessarily correspond to higher probability of contagion. For instance, an insti-
tution with many equally spread exposures is more likely to withstand a default of one of its counterparties
(provided its other debtors stay healthy). This is the old story of diversification applied to network-systemic
riskiness, see e.g. Frey and Hledik (2014).
19We observe a zero disclosure effect for an empty network with no connections as well as for a full network
without any trading frictions as expected from standard theory.
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of the disclosure effect based on this ordering. More systemically important banks tend to
experience a lower disclosure effect. Moreover, the uncertainty associated with the disclosure,
as measured by the standard deviation, is slightly larger for such banks. In order to be more
specific, the more systematically important the bank, the higher the likelihood that the
disclosure effect will be negative. The effect is opposite for less important banks where the
disclosure effect is on average higher.20
[Figures B.4a and B.4b]
The intuition behind this result is simple. In our model, information is only valuable to
the extent that it allows banks to optimally re-adjust their portfolio holdings. At the same
time, systemically relevant banks are at the center of other banks’ exposures. This implies
that they are the ones least enjoying the benefits of new information, while suffering the
costs imposed by the other banks’ re-adjustments.21
3.2 The Disclosure Effect in Core-Periphery Random Networks
In order to verify that our results persist if we move from the basic case of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random networks, we calibrate our network structure on the data of Austrian interbank
market. Since the network density in this case is given, we can only report the relationship
between disclosure effect and network systemic importance.
[Figures B.4c and B.4d]
Figures B.4c and B.4d again show that the most systemically relevant banks are expected
to gain the least from the information disclosure.
20Our simulations are qualitatively unchanged for different system dimensions. We have tested the frame-
work on networks of sizes 50 and 100. Increasing the overall dimension of the system improves banks’ ability
to diversify and therefore decreases the variance of the disclosure effect.
21Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2017b) argue that banks tend to invest into assets that
are heavily correlated with each other, hence increasing their systemic importance. In our model, the assets
that are heavily invested in are the ones belonging to heavily connected-to institutions.
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The basic intuition behind this result is the same as the one presented for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random networks: information is only valuable to the extent that it allows banks to opti-
mally re-adjust their portfolio holdings. In the core-periphery random network we observe
an even stronger negative disclosure effect for systemically relevant banks because of the
structural characteristics of this type of network. Here it arises naturally that banks with
many in-degree connections have fewer out-degree connections. This furthermore reduces the
value of the new information for systemically important banks, as compared to the previous
environment with Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks.
4 Empirical Evidence
We provide a simple empirical analysis using the 2011 and 2014 stress tests conducted by
the European Banking Authority to support our results.22 Our theoretical model suggests
that being subjected to information disclosure is expected to have an impact on bank’s
risk-adjusted expected profits.
We develop a simple event study to explore this hypothesis using the following baseline
linear model:
Πbct = β ·D.Stress Testbct−1 + γ ·Xbct + act + ab + bst, (13)
where Πbct is the risk-adjusted expected profit of bank b in country c at time t. D.Stress
Test is an indicator variable equal to one if a bank was subjected to a stress test in the
previous quarter and zero otherwise. Moreover, our model accounts for time-varying banks’
characteristics by including the set of standard controls X (see Ellul and Yerramilli (2013),
Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013)). It contains the following variables: Tier 1 capital
ratio, size as measured by the value of total assets, total gross loans, and total deposits. More
details on the definition of all variables can be found in Table 1. Lastly, we take steps to
22We do not account for the stress tests conducted in 2009 and 2010 because the stress testing has been
subjected to a significant restructuring by the EBA in 2011.
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account for bank-specific time-invariant unobservables and country-specific common trends
by including the appropriate fixed effects.
In addition to this baseline scenario, we also consider a specification with further control
variables, particularly the Loan Loss Reserve and the ratio of Liquid Assets over Liabilities.
These are also described in Table 1. We also use leads of the main explanatory variable
(D.Stress Test) to account for possible systematic difference in the trends of the dependent
variable for treated and control group of banks. Moreover, we use lags to account for potential
after treatment reversals.
Our interest lies in the parameter β which quantifies the marginal contribution of the
stress test participation towards the risk-adjusted expected profits.
We use data from SNL Financial. Our sample in the baseline specification includes 1,818
bank-quarterly observations over the years 2011, 2014, and 2015.23 Our sample includes 725
unique banks. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical
analysis. This suggests that we are working with a representative sample. Importantly, as a
proxy for the unobservable risk-adjusted expected profits, Π, we use the ratio of net income
and risk-weighted assets.
Column (1) in Table 4 shows results from the estimation of the baseline scenario in
Equation (13). Columns (2)-(4) add subsequent controls to this specification as well as
further differentiation between listed and non-listed banks. Across all these specifications,
the point estimate for β is negative and statistically significant. In our model, this inverse
relationship would correspond to a negative disclosure effect DE . Since the banks chosen for
the stress test are arguably the systemically important ones, it is reasonable to claim that the
observed relationship is in line with our theoretical results. This claim is further supported
by the slight increase of β when performing a subsample analysis on publicly listed banks in
column (2). Columns (3) and (4) serve as a further robustness check of our approach.24
23These years correspond to the time when stress tests took place. The first was conducted in the third
quarter of 2011, while the second took place in the fourth quarter of 2014 (hence the need for including the
year 2015).
24Column (3) adds the banks’ loan loss reserve and the ratio of their liquid assets over all liabilities. Both
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One should not view our estimates as causal, exactly due to the non-random choice of
stress tested banks. Hence, we can only argue correlation, not causality.25 However, Figure
B.5 shows no statistical difference in risk adjusted profits between the two groups of banks
(stress-tested and not stress-tested) in the quarter before and the quarter during the stress
test. The effect observable in the quarter following the stress test can therefore be attributed
to whether a bank was part of it or not.
5 Conclusion
In a world without frictions, banks are only subjected to the market risk such that the
introduction of new information cannot possibly be detrimental. However, the situation is
different if banks are constrained in their trading opportunities. In such a case the new
information generates non-hedgeable risk. This additional risk comes from the negative
externalities imposed by other banks’ portfolio adjustments.
We show that - in such a constrained economy - the disclosure of information results in a
reduction of risk-adjusted expected profits for a non-negligible fraction of banks. This effect
depends on the structural features of banks’ portfolio constraints and is more pronounced
for systemically important banks. We observe this result in both the homogeneous and
core-periphery systems and we provide empirical evidence supporting these findings.
Altogether, our results suggest that a regulator should carefully consider possible effects
of information disclosure via an interbank network channel, especially on systemically im-
portant institutions. Using the information on system structure in line with our reasoning
may prove beneficial for a policy design. Quantitative results could potentially be obtained
measure the flexibility of a bank when threatened with a particular type of shock. Column (4) further includes
contemporaneous, leading and lagged D.Stress Test variable. The results show statistical significance only
in the quarter directly following the stress test exercise.
25To pin down the causal effect of disclosure is of great interest in the accounting research. Leuz and
Wysocki (2016) review the existing empirical literature and provide avenues for future research. As pointed
out in their paper, there is lack of good counterfactuals that would move the field forward and allow to make
causal statements on the effect of disclosure. We relate to that literature as our experiment does not provide
the ideal research environment to pin down the causal effect of the information disclosure as a consequence
of the stress test procedure.
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by calibrating our framework to a network structure observed by the regulator.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1. The proof follows immediately by solving the following maximiza-
tion problem,
max
{φi,θi}∈RN+1
{
E[Yi]− 1
2
Var [Yi]
}
s.t.
pi = p
′φi + θi
Yi = X′φi + θi
φi ∈ Ai1 × Ai2 × · · · × AiN
Ain =

R if gin = 1
{∅} if gin = 0
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
(14)
After plugging the first two constraints into the objective function we obtain the La-
grangian for bank i ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
L = µ′φi + pi − p′φi − 1
2
φ′Σφi − λ′iφi, (15)
where the last term corresponds to the network constraint.
The first order condition gives bank’s i optimal demand for risky assets, φ∗i . That is,
∂L
∂φi
= 0 =⇒ φ∗i = Σ−1 (µ− p− λi) . (16)
The optimal demand for the risk-free asset, θ∗i , follows from the resource constraint,
θ∗i = pi − p′Σ−1 (µ− p− λi) (17)
The equilibrium price vector is obtained by equating the aggregate demand to the aggre-
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gate supply of risky projects in the economy, that is
φ∗1 + φ
∗
2 + · · ·+ φ∗N = 1 (18)
substituting the optimal φ∗ from equation (16) and solving for p yields:
p∗ = µ− 1
N
Σ1− 1
N
N∑
j=1
λj (19)
This concludes the proof.
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B Figures
(a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network. (b) Core-periphery network.
Figure B.1. One realization of a random network for N = 100 banks.
(a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=50 banks. (b) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=100 banks.
Figure B.2. Distribution of Disclosure Effect as a function of network density. This
figure plots the cumulative distribution of the average disclosure effect for different network
densities. The dash line corresponds to networks with density below the median, while the
dash-dotted line stands for networks with density above the median. The disclosure effect
is measured as a percentage change of the expected risk-adjusted profits with and without
disclosure. The simulation comprises 15, 000 iterations and the networks are generated using
the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model.
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(a) Core-Periphery network with N=50 banks. (b) Core-Periphery network with N=100 banks.
Figure B.3. Disclosure effect +/- one standard deviation as a function of network density.
The disclosure effect is measured as a percentage change of the expected risk-adjusted profits
with and without disclosure. The simulation comprises 15, 000 iterations and the networks
are generated using the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model.
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(a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=50 banks. (b) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=100 banks.
(c) Core-Periphery network with N=50 banks. (d) Core-Periphery network with N=100 banks.
Figure B.4. Disclosure effect as a function of systemic importance. This figure plots the
disclosure effect +/- one standard deviation for banks ranked according to the SI index,
which corresponds to the network systemic importance of a bank. The bank ranked SI = 1
is the most systemically relevant, while the bank ranked SI = 50 is the least systemically
relevant. The disclosure effect is measured as a percentage change of the expected risk-
adjusted profits with and without disclosure. The simulation comprises 15, 000 iterations
and the networks are generated using either the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model (Figures B.4a, B.4b) or
the core-periphery model (Figures B.4c, B.4d).
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Figure B.5. The coefficient estimate for the contemporaneous, leading and lagged variable
D.Stress Test as seen in column (4) of Table 4
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C Tables
Table 1. Variable Description
Variable Label Description
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Risk-Adj Profit Ratio between net income and the value of risk-weighted
assets.
Panel B: Explanatory Variables
D.Stress Test Dummy variable equal to one if a bank is subjected to
stress test assessment, and zero otherwise.
Tier 1 Ratio Ratio between Tier 1 capital, as defined by Basel Accord,
and the value of risk-weighted assets.
Size The natural logarithm of the value of total assets.
Total Gross Loans The value of total gross loans divided by the value of risk-
weighted assets.
Total Deposit The value of deposits divided by the value of risk-weighted
assets.
Liquid Assets/Liabilities (%) The ratio between liquid assets and total liabilities as de-
fined by SNL Financial.
Loan Loss Reserve The accounting measure loan loss reserve scaled by the
value of risk-weighted assets.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
The table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Data are from SNL
Financial covering the years 2011, 2014, and 2015. There are a total of 1,818 bank-quarter observations for
a total of 725 unique banks. The dependent variable, Risk-Adj Profit, is computed as the ratio between net
income and the value of risk-weighted assets. More details on the computation of covariates can be found in
Table 1. All variables are Winsorized at 1% tail.
Mean SD P25 Median P75
Dependent Variable
Risk-Adj Profit 0.17 0.84 0.08 0.25 0.43
Control Variables
D.Stress Test 0.04 0.19 0 0 0
Tier 1 Ratio 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17
Size 15.41 2.37 13.50 14.95 16.91
Total Gross Loans 1.35 0.69 0.99 1.25 1.53
Total Deposit 1.12 0.52 0.85 1.09 1.33
Loan Loss Reserve 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06
Liquid Assets/Liabilities (%) 31.8 20.93 17.32 25.99 41.09
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Table 4. Event Study on 2011 and 2014 Stress Test
The table reports the results from estimating Equation (13). The dependent variable is the Risk-Adj Profit
for all specifications. It is computed as the ratio between net income and the value of risk-weighted assets.
The covariates include: D.Stress Test, Tier 1 Ratio, Size, Total Loans, Total Deposit, Loan Loss Reserve, and
Liquid Assets/Liabilities. More details on the definition of variables can be found in Table 1. All variables
are Winsorized at 1% tail. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at bank level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Risk-Adjusted Profits
Baseline Listed Robustness
D.Stress Testt−2 -0.039
(0.121)
D.Stress Testt−1 -0.386∗∗ -0.483∗∗ -0.575∗∗ -0.594∗∗
(0.175) (0.240) (0.233) (0.239)
D.Stress Testt -0.050
(0.149)
D.Stress Testt+1 -0.054
(0.122)
Tier 1 5.774∗∗∗ 11.543∗∗∗ 3.681∗∗ 3.355
(1.689) (4.309) (1.786) (2.110)
Bank Size 0.482∗∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.437∗∗
(0.194) (0.288) (0.210) (0.215)
Total Gross Loans 0.054 -0.306 0.049 0.062
(0.066) (0.260) (0.072) (0.077)
Total Deposit 0.077 0.241 0.308∗ 0.359∗
(0.127) (0.180) (0.178) (0.184)
Loan Loss Reserve -2.485 -2.285
(3.204) (3.340)
Liquid Assets/Liabilities (%) -0.011∗∗ -0.010∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter by Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,818 1,091 1,031 961
Adjusted R2 0.751 0.787 0.756 0.764
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